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Abstract
We present a model of political budget cycles in which incumbents inﬂuence voters by targeting
government spending to speciﬁc groups of voters at the expense of other voters or other expen-
ditures. Each voter faces a signal extraction problem: being targeted with expenditure before
the election may reﬂect opportunistic manipulation, but may also reﬂect a sincere preference of
the incumbent for the types of spending that voter prefers. We show the existence of a political
equilibrium in which rational voters support an incumbent who targets them with spending before
the election even though they know it may be electorally motivated. In equilibrium voters in the
more “swing” regions are targeted at the expense of types of spending not favored by these voters.
This will be true even if they know they live in swing regions. However, the responsiveness of these
voters to electoral manipulation depends on whether they face some degree of uncertainty about
the electoral importance of the group they are in. Use of targeted spending also implies voters
can be inﬂuenced without election-year deﬁcits, consistent with recent ﬁndings for established
democracies.
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Conventional wisdom is that incumbents use economic policy — especially ﬁscal policy — before
elections to inﬂuence electoral outcomes. A number of studies (Shi and Svensson [2006], Persson and
Tabellini [2003]) ﬁnd evidence of an electoral deﬁcit or expenditure cycle in a broad cross-section
of countries, an empirical ﬁnding that Brender and Drazen (2005a) argue reﬂects electoral cycles
in a subset of these countries, namely those that recently democratized. These “new democracies”
are characterized by increases in government deﬁcits in election years in the ﬁrst few elections after
the transition to democracy. In contrast, in “established” democracies, they ﬁnd no statistically
signiﬁcant political cycle across countries in aggregate central government expenditure or deﬁcits, a
ﬁnding which is robust to various speciﬁcations.
The ﬁnding of no political deﬁcit cycle in established democracies raises an obvious question:
Is ﬁscal manipulation absent or, more likely, does it simply appear in diﬀerent forms? That is, in
established democracies, do politicians use election-year ﬁscal policy to inﬂuence voters in such a
way that the overall government budget deﬁcit is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected? This could occur, for
example, if some groups of voters are targeted at the expense of others. Groups whose voting behavior
is seen as especially susceptible to targeted ﬁscal policy may be targeted with higher expenditures
a n dt r a n s f e r s ,o rb yt a xc u t s ,ﬁnanced by expenditure cuts or tax increases on other groups whose
votes are much less sensitive to such policy. Such election-year “pork barrel spending”, by which
we mean policies or legislation targeted to speciﬁc groups of voters to gain their political support,
is widely seen as an especially important component of electoral manipulation. Policies of this type
include geographically concentrated investment projects (a common, more narrow deﬁnition of “pork
barrel spending”), expenditures and transfers targeted to speciﬁc demographic groups, or tax cuts
beneﬁtting certain sectors.1 In this paper, we develop a model of electoral manipulation via targeting
speciﬁc groups of voters with government spending, where there is no eﬀect on total spending or the
deﬁcit.
Several papers ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant changes in the composition of government spending
in election years. Khemani (2004) ﬁnds that Indian states spend more on public investment before
scheduled elections that in other times, while they contract current spending, leaving the overall
balance unchanged. Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) look for evidence of a political budget cycle
1An alternative possibility is a change in the composition of expenditures towards those that are highly valued by
voters as a whole and away from those that are less valued. If politicians are believed to diﬀer in their (not directly
observed) preferences over types of expenditures, all voters will prefer a politician whose preferences are more towards
expenditures that they prefer. We study such a set-up in Drazen and Eslava (2005).
1for Canadian provinces, and ﬁnd no evidence of a cycle in aggregate spending, but do ﬁnd electoral
increases in what they call “visible expenditures”, mostly investment expenses such as construction of
roads and structures. Very similar ﬁndings are reported for Mexico by Gonzales (2002), who also ﬁnds
that other categories of spending, such as current transfers, contract prior to elections. Drazen and
Eslava (2005) present empirical evidence on compositional eﬀects in regional political budget cycles
in Colombia, where investment projects grow before elections, while current spending contracts.
Interestingly, electoral composition eﬀects seem to imply expansions in development projects, which
are in general easily targeted. Khemani (2004), for instance, argues that his ﬁnding of greater public
investment before elections suggests that election-year policy takes the form of targeting of special
interests, rather than an attempt to sway the mass of voters at large.
The evidence of electoral eﬀects on the composition of spending, rather than on the overall deﬁcit,
is consistent with ﬁndings on how voters react to election-year government deﬁcits, both in individual
country and in cross-section studies. Brender (2003) ﬁnds that voters in Israel penalize election year
deﬁcits, but also that they reward high expenditure in development projects in the year that precedes
an election. Similarly, Peltzman’s (1992) result that U.S. voters punish government spending holds
for current (as opposed to capital) expenditures, but is weaker if investment in roads, an important
component of public investment, is included in his policy variable. Drazen and Eslava (2005) ﬁnd that
voters in Colombia reward high pre-election public investment, but only to the extent that this extra
spending is not obtained at the expense of larger deﬁcits. Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998) look at
election outcomes and opinion polls for 19 OECD countries and ﬁnd that after sharp ﬁscal adjustments
based mostly on current spending cuts, the probability that an incumbent remains in power does not
fall. Perhaps the strongest evidence suggesting that deﬁcits do not help reelection prospects comes
from Brender and Drazen (2005b) in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960-2003. They
ﬁnd no evidence that deﬁcits help reelection in any group of countries, including developed and less
developed, new and old democracies, countries with diﬀerent government or electoral systems, and
countries with diﬀerent levels of democracy. In developed countries and established democracies, they
ﬁnd that election-year deﬁcits actually signiﬁcantly reduce the probability that a leader is reelected.
In short, the strategy of using targeted increases in spending before elections ﬁnanced by cuts on
some other types of spending rather than by increased deﬁcits seems to be optimal for an incumbent
seeking re-election.
In spite of the widespread use of policies targeted at speciﬁc groups of voters or types of expen-
ditures before elections, there are no rational-voter models of the political cycle integrating targeted
2expenditures that are truly intertemporal. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan
(1996) present formal models where, in order to gain votes, candidates make promises of spending
to some voter groups (based on their characteristics) ﬁnanced by cuts in spending on other groups
so as to keep the government budget balanced. However, they assume that campaign promises are
binding commitments to a post-electoral ﬁscal policy. Hence, in these models the problem of who
gets targeted is essentially a static one, with no voter inference problem about post-electoral utility
based on the pre-electoral economic magnitudes announced by candidates.2 Hence, these models do
not really answer a key question: Why would rational, forward-looking voters who are targeted by
the incumbent before the election ﬁnd it optimal to vote for him? The answer is far from obvious:
if Floridians know that politicians target them solely because of a forthcoming election, why would
they believe that such spending will continue after the incumbent is reelected? This paper squarely
addresses this question, incorporating expenditure targeting in a framework of repeated elections
with rational voters.3
The best known approach in modeling why rational, forward-looking voters might respond to
election-year economics was introduced by Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988) and Rogoﬀ (1990), based on
the unobservability of an incumbent’s ability or “competence” in providing aggregate expenditures
without raising taxes.4 More “competent” candidates can provide more public goods at a given level
of taxes, and hence generate higher welfare, so they are preferred by voters. Since competence is
correlated over time, a candidate who is inferred by voters to be more competent than average before
the election is expected to be so after the election as well.5 Voters rationally prefer a candidate from
whom they observe higher expenditures before an election, since this is a signal of higher competence,
implying higher overall expenditure after the election.
A key ingredient of various models focussing on competence is voters’ inability to observe the
overall level of spending or of the deﬁcit (Rogoﬀ [1990], Shi and Svensson [2006]). Because of this
assumption, the competence approach often implies an increase in total government expenditures (or
2Most other papers that consider the allocation of “pork” across diﬀerent groups of voters (Myerson (1993), Persson,
Roland, and Tabellini (2000), Lizzeri and Persico (2001)) similarly assume that candidates make binding promises to
voters. Grossman and Helpman (2005) do not assume binding promises. However, as in the other papers, pre-electoral
distribution of pork per se plays no role in determining election outcomes. Furthermore, in their paper there is no voter
uncertainty about policymakers preferences over the allocation of pork, which is central to our approach.
3Strömberg (2005) presents an interesting model of the campaign visits by presidential candidates to diﬀerent U.S.
states (a type of targeting), but where voter response to targeting is assumed rather than derived from primitives.
4Other rational voter models include Persson and Tabellini (1990), González (2001), Stein and Streb (2004), and
Shi and Svensson (2006). All of these models share with the Rogoﬀ approach a reliance on the eﬀect of pre-electoral
ﬁscal expansion on expected aggregate activity or welfare after the election.
5A key innovation of Shi and Svensson (2006) is that the policymaker chooses ﬁscal policy before he knows his
competence level, so that all “types” choose the same level of expansion. That is, the model focusses on moral hazard
rather than signaling, as do the other models. An implication is an aggregate deﬁcit cycle.
3in the government budget deﬁcit) in an election year. This relation between voters’ lack of information
and aggregate ﬁscal expansion is consistent with Brender and Drazen’s (2005a) empirical ﬁnding of
no statistically signiﬁcant aggregate deﬁcit or expenditure cycle in established democracies, where
voters may be well informed about ﬁscal outcomes.
The absence of political budget cycles in democracies where voters are experienced and presumably
informed about ﬁscal policy (and the further ﬁnding of Brender and Drazen [2005b] that higher
election-year expenditures or deﬁcits do not increase an incumbent’s probability of reelection in
these democracies), suggests that rational voters may be trying to infer something other than (or in
addition to) competence from election-year ﬁscal policy. That is, these empirical ﬁndings suggest that
imperfect information about competence alone is not a suﬃcient basis for an asymmetric information
explanation of voter response to election-year policies. On the other hand, since expenditure targeted
at some groups of voters is a common form of election-year policy, voters may use pre-election
economic policy to learn not primarily the likely level of post-electoral expenditure (if the incumbent
is re-elected) as in the competence approach, but the composition of expenditure across groups of
voters. Put simply, voters targeted before an election want to know whether they will be similarly
favored after the election if the incumbent is re-elected.
If voters are indeed using pre-election spending to make inferences about the composition of
government spending after the election, one wonders: What makes it credible that a politician will
continue to favor the same groups after the election that he targeted before? Our argument is that
politicians have unobserved preferences over groups of voters or types of expenditure, preferences
that have some persistence over time. This persistence implies that a voter who believes that the
incumbent favors him before the election rationally expects some similarity in the composition of
expenditures after the election as well.6
This change from the competence approach in the unobserved characteristic of incumbents sig-
niﬁcantly changes the nature of the inference problem that voters face. In models in the Rogoﬀ
tradition, a voter must infer whether high pre-electoral expenditure on an observable component of
the budget reﬂects higher incumbent ability to provide goods in general, or whether it is “purchased”
at the expense of a cut in some other good (or a tax increase) observed only after the election. In
our model, instead, a voter knows how a change in spending was ﬁnanced and what was the total
spending, but tries to learn to what extent the pre-election composition of spending will be replicated
6Another argument is that politicians who renege on the (implicit) commitment to continue a government program
after the election may lose the ability to use ﬁscal policy as a tool to inﬂuence voters in future elections. This may
make the pre-election composition of expenditure a credible signal of the composition the incumbent would choose if
re-elected.
4after the election and, based on that inference, whether he will be better oﬀ under the incumbent or
the challenger. As a result, electoral ﬁscal policy may be present even if voters can perfectly observe
all of the elements of ﬁs c a lp o l i c y . T h i si so n ek e yd i ﬀerence between our model and those in the
competence tradition.
In our approach, moreover, a voter may have imperfect information both about the politicians’s
preferences over diﬀerent voter groups and about voting patterns over the population. If both types
of asymmetric information are present, each voter must try to infer whether receiving high targeted
expenditures before the election signals a high weight of his group in the incumbent’s objective func-
tion (relative to other voters or to non-targeted expenditures) or simply how “swing” his demographic
group is, meaning how many votes the incumbent can raise by targeting his group with expenditures.
Put more simply, a politicians tries to convince a voter that he truly “likes” him (or has the same
objectives), while voters wonder whether the expressions of love and caring will disappear once the
votes are counted.
Our emphasis on cycles in the composition of spending, rather than its overall level, is consistent
with the evidence cited above that voters are “ﬁscal conservatives” who punish (rather than reward)
high spending or deﬁcits at the polls. Our model in fact suggests that, if voters are averse to
deﬁcits, observability of ﬁscal policy strengthens the incentive to ﬁnance electoral spending through
the contraction of other expenditures. The greater ability of voters to monitor ﬁscal outcomes in
established democracies may help explain the absence of signiﬁcant political deﬁcit cycles.
Another key diﬀerence with the competence literature is that political budget cycles in our model
arise even if all politicians are equally able to provide public goods. We assume here that all politicians
are equally competent in delivering pork in order to obtain a clear contrast with that literature, rather
than because we think competence is unimportant. We are aware that in a system with geographically
deﬁned districts, legislators often campaign for reelection on the basis of their ability to obtain projects
for their district. However, if competence in getting pork is general and not speciﬁc to a demographic
group (as, for example, Dixit and Londregan [1996]) or type of expenditure (as in Strömberg [2001]),
demonstrating competence in delivering pork may be necessary to be reelected, but it would not
be suﬃcient. Suppose a speciﬁc group of voters believed that a politician was very competent in
delivering pork, but also believed that he did not care about them at times other than elections.
These voters would then expect that after the election he will use his pork-raising competence to
beneﬁt other groups, so they would have no reason to vote for him on the basis of high perceived
5competence.7 Hence, preferences over groups of voters seem crucial in explaining pork-barrel politics.
In reality, both politician competence and politician preferences are no doubt important in explaining
the importance of pork in elections, but here we focus on the role of the latter, which has not been
much explored.
In a model with asymmetric information about the preferences of politicians, and possibly also
with asymmetric information about how “swing” diﬀerent groups in society are, we demonstrate that
there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which voters rationally respond to election-year expen-
ditures and politicians allocate expenditure across groups on the basis of this behavior. Politicians
increase spending targeted to electorally attractive groups before elections, while they contract other
types of expenditure to satisfy the no-deﬁcit constraint. As mentioned, a key result is that electoral
manipulation arises even with fully rational voters. We further show that the responsiveness of voters
to ﬁscal manipulation depends on the amount of information they have about how “swing” diﬀerent
groups are; however, a political cycle arises even when voters know how “swing” each group is.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present an overview of our approach.
In section 3 we present a model of politicians with unobserved preferences over groups of voters.
In section 4 we show the existence of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for this model with rational,
forward-looking voters in which there is a political cycle in the composition of expenditure. In
section 5 we add a good valued only by politicians (“oﬃce rents”) to show that electoral ﬁscal
manipulation might entail some groups being targeted at the expense of others, or all voter groups
being targeted at the expense of oﬃce rents that politicians value. Because of the diﬃculty of
analytically ﬁnding an equilibrium, in section 6 we present an example which illustrates the political
equilibrium. Conclusions are presented in section 7.
2A n O v e r v i e w
To help readers better understand the detailed model in section 3, we ﬁrst present an outline of
our basic argument. We exposit the model in terms of geographically-targeted expenditure, which is
important in many political systems, but stress that our argument applies equally well to spending
that can be targeted at groups deﬁned along dimensions other than the geographical. Hence, our
analysis is relevant not only to majoritarian systems with geographically deﬁned districts, but also to
other types of electoral systems, such as proportional systems, in which parties may target diﬀerent
7This issue does not arise in the Rogoﬀ (1990) model since competence is used to provide public goods that beneﬁt
all voters equally.
6types of voters. (This is consistent with our broad deﬁnition of “pork barrel spending” set out in the
introduction.)
Furthermore, though policy is made by a single policymaker, as in a stylized presidential system,
the basic argument is applicable to parliamentary systems in which policy is the result of bargaining
within a legislature. In such models, bargaining strength in the legislature depends on vote shares,
but the nature of legislative interactions means that policy outcomes may depend in complicated ways
on the vote share that a party receives. Sophisticated voters with policy preferences may thus ﬁnd it
optimal to vote strategically rather than sincerely in a multi-candidate election, as in the models of
Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) or Baron and Diermeier (2001). However, since parties attract votes
on the basis of the policy preferences voters perceive that they have, the key voter inference problem
in our model should be crucial in parliamentary systems as well. In short, though we exposit our
m o d e li naw a yc o n s i s t e n tw i t has p e c i ﬁc set of electoral and legislative rules, we believe that the
analysis is applicable to a far broader set of political institutions.
We assume that there is an election between an incumbent and a challenger at the end of every
other period (“year”) t, t +2 , etc. The incumbent has the ability to choose ﬁscal policy, where, for
simplicity, we focus on the targeting of expenditures, and simply assume (in line with voters being
ﬁscal conservatives) that incumbents can neither raise taxes, nor incur deﬁcits. Hence, the sum of all
expenditures must always equal the ﬁxed level of taxes.
There are two regions, h =1 ,2, where voters in each region value a public good gh
t supplied to
their region. Since taxes are assumed ﬁxed, we abstract here from other types of consumption which
could be aﬀected by tax policy. The utility of individual j in region h also depends on the distance
between his most desired position πj over other policies (which is immutable and termed “ideology”)
and the position πP of the politician P in power.
Within each region h, there is a non-degenerate distribution of ideological preferences, which may
change between elections. We denote the density function of voters in region h in the current election
cycle as fh(π), where we suppress the time subscript. We consider both the case where the fh(π)
are known to both voters and politicians, as well as the case of asymmetric information where the
incumbent knows the densities fh(π), while voters only have imperfect information about them. The
nature of the cycle is aﬀected by the information speciﬁcation, but in both cases a rational political
cycle exists. For simplicity, we assume that the preference distribution is uncorrelated over elections,
so that past electoral policy gives voters no information about the current distribution.
There are two parties L and R, with known ideological positions πL <π R,w h e r ew et a k eπL and
7πR as given and assume no competition over ideology. Without loss of generality, we assume that
party L is the incumbent.
The single-period utility of a voter in region h with ideological preferences πj if policymaker
A ∈ {L,R} is in oﬃce is
Uh,j
s (A)=l ngh
s (A) −
¡
πj − πA¢2
(1)
where gh
s (A) is public good provided by policymaker A to region h in period s. Voters care about
the present discounted value of utility, and hence, about expected future values of gh
s. (Since gh
s (A)
does not depend on j,w ei g n o r et h ei n d e xj in discussing the central problem of inferring gh
t+1 from
gh
t .)
Politicians, as actual or potential leaders of both regions, give weight to the utility from govern-
ment spending of voters of each region.8 This may be represented by a weight ωh
P,s that politician
P puts on utility from public goods of residents of that region, that is, on lngh
t . (Since ideological
preferences πj of both voters and politician’s are ﬁxed, putting the weight ωh
P,s on a voter’s total
utility (1) would not qualitatively change the basic results.) A politician P’s single-period utility in
period s if the policy in place is πA may be written
UP
s = ZP
s (gs) −
¡
πP − πA¢2
(2)
where gs is the vector
¡
g1
s,g2
s
¢
and
ZP
s (gs)=
2 X
h=1
ωh
P,slngh
s .( 3 )
In contrast to the politician’s ideological preferences πP which are known, the weights ωh
P,s are
unknown to voters.9 The key inference problem giving rise to the possible eﬀectiveness of election-
year spending in inﬂuencing rational voters may now be stated. The voter’s problem is to infer the
unobserved weight ωh
P,t from the politician’s observable choice of gh
t .I fωh
P,t has some persistence over
8The diﬀerence between the objective functions of politicians and voters consistent with the “citizen-candidate”
approach of Besley and Coate (1997) or Osborne and Slivinski (1996). A key message of that approach is that because
candidates have preferences just like citizens, they can be expected to act on those preferences once elected, rather than
be bound by campaign “promises”. This view is in fact central to our approach, where a voter’s key inference problem is
in discerning what those preferences are. We diverge from the basic citizen-candidate model in assuming that a citizen
who is elected to make policy for an area wider than his or her own district will no longer act on the same (narrower)
preferences he or she did when being a simply a member of (or representing) that district. We would argue that this
assumption is quite reasonable. We do not model this “transformation” of preferences.
9Bonomo and Terra (2005) consider politicians who have preferences over sectors, but where these preferences are
known.
8time, then pre-electoral gh
t may contain information not only about ωh
P,t, but also about ωh
P,t+1 and
hence gh
t+1, inducing forward-looking voters to respond to pre-electoral ﬁscal policy.10
Why would voters not know a politician’s preferences? (See footnote 8 on why these preferences
are not identical to those of a citizen from the politician’s region.) That is, there really an inference
problem? We would argue that since the real world is multidimensional, a voter is necessarily uncer-
tain about how much the politician will favor him relative to other priorities. Moreover, because the
politician’s environment changes over time, these preferences may change over time, but at the same
time will display some persistence.
Another key question is why voters look at ﬁscal policy only right before the elections, in order to
try to infer a politician’s preferences, rather than at policy earlier in the incumbent’s term. As in most
of the literature, we assume that unobserved preferences (here ωh
P,t) are evolving over time in such a
way that the most recent policy observation is the more informative about future policy than earlier
observations.11 We believe this partly captures the evolution of a politician’s preferences, which
may change over time (albeit slowly), justifying voters’ concentration on recent policy to infer these
preferences. The media follow policy more as elections get closer, reﬂecting greater voter interest in
policy developments closer to elections. This suggests perhaps that voters believe that they have more
to learn closer to elections, but may also be a reason why voters are more responsive to pre-election
policy.
We now turn to the details. We start by looking at the problem of an incumbent politician, given
the ﬁscal framework, then move to the voters’s problem, and ﬁnally put the pieces together to ﬁnd
the equilibrium.
3 A Model of Politicians Who Have Preferences over Voters
3.1 The Incumbent’s Problem
Politicians diﬀer in the unobserved weight ωh
P,s they put on voters of the two regions (or groups)
in their objective function (2), as summarized by (3). For simplicity, we assume that ωh
P,s is drawn
from an i.i.d. distribution at the beginning of every election year for two years and that ω2
P,s =1 −ω1
P,s.
(That is, ωh
P,t+1 = ωh
P,t if t is an election year, but ωh
P,t and ωh
P,t+2 are uncorrelated.) No correlation
10In the case where voters in the two regions care about both goods, targeting would be of a good rather than of a
region (which in this formulation are identical.) See footnote 17.
11In contrast to the standard approach in the literature, Martinez (2005) presents a very diﬀerent type of model
of how an incumbent’s performance reputation might evolve over time and shows that policy outcomes closest to the
elections may not necessarily provide the most information about unobserved politician characteristics.
9in ωh
P,s across electoral cycles greatly simpliﬁes the voters’s inference problem, since observed policy
in previous elections provides no information about current ωh
P,s.12 The distribution of ωh
P,t,w h i c h
is the same for both incumbent and challenger, is deﬁned over
¡
ωl,ωu¢
,w h e r e0 ≤ ωl <ω u ≤ 1 and
has a mean of ω.
3.1.1 The oﬀ-year decision
A politician L who was elected in t has an objective function ΩIN
t+1 in the following non-election year
t+1(when he is in oﬃce and not facing an election in t+1) for the vector of public goods expenditure
gL
t+1 of
ΩIN
t+1(gL
t+1,L)=
2 X
h=1
ωh
P,t+1 lngh
t+1 + βEL
t+1
¡
ΩELE
t+2 (·,L)
¢
(4)
where β is the discount factor and EL
t+1
¡
ΩELE
t+2
¢
is L’s expectation as of period t +1of the present
discounted value of utility from t +2(an election year) onward. (Since the actual policy πA = πP,
(2) and (3) yield current-period utility of
P
h ωh
P,slngh
s in an oﬀ-election year.) The assumptions that
the government’s budget is balanced each period and that ωh
L as of t has a two-period life imply that
actions at t +1have no eﬀect on ΩE
t+2.T h e i n c u m b e n t ’ s o ﬀ-year problem is simply to choose the
gh
t+1 to maximize
P2
h=1 ωh
P,t+1 lngh
t+1 subject to his budget constraint.
Total expenditures equal total tax revenues, which are assumed ﬁxed and set equal to unity. (All
politicians are thus identical in terms of total spending.) The choice of ﬁscal policy is the choice of
composition of the government budget, which comprises expenditures that can be targeted to speciﬁc
groups of voters, and other types of expenditure. For simplicity, in this section, we assume that there
are no expenditures other than public goods g1 and g2. (In section 5 we consider the implications
of politicians also spending on goods that they alone value, that is, “oﬃce rents”.) Therefore, each
period, the government faces the budget constraint:
g1
s + g2
s =1 s = t,t +1 ,... (5)
The ﬁrst-order condition for the politician’s oﬀ-election year problem is:
12Assuming ω
h
P,s follows an MA(1) process with innovations that are revealed to voters with a one-period lag has
these implications. This alternative type of assumption is, for instance, the one used in Rogoﬀ (1990). A political
budget cycle would also arise with an MA(1) process with innovations that are never revealed to voters, as long as
imperfect persistence of ω
h
P,s makes g
h
t−1 a more relevant signal to voters than expenses observed further into the past.
However, this assumption makes the analysis of the problem far more complicated.
10ω1
L
g1
t+1
=
ω2
L
g2
t+1
(6)
where, for ease of exposition, we drop the time subscript on ωh
L,s,t h a ti s ,w ew r i t eωh
L,t = ωh
L,t+1 = ωh
L.
Using ω2
L =1− ω1
L and g2
t+1 =1 − g1
t+1 from (5),
gh
t+1 = ωh
L h =1 ,2 (7)
so that voters’s expected utility from reelecting the incumbent is increasing in ωh
L.
3.1.2 The value of reelection
The value to L of reelection in t depends on the diﬀerence between his expected value of being in
oﬃce in t +1 , EL
t
¡
ΩIN
t+1
¢
, and his expected value of being out of oﬃce, EL
t
¡
ΩOUT
t+1
¢
,w h e r eEL
t (·) is
L’s expectation as of period t and the values of Ωt+1 are the present discounted values from t +1
onward. The diﬀerence Et
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
may be written
EL
t
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
=( 1+β)
¡
πL − πR¢2
+ EL
t
¡
ZL
t+1
¡
gL
t+1
¢
− ZL
t+1
¡
gR
t+1
¢¢
+ β2EL
t Πt+3 (8)
where β is the discount factor and EtΠt+3 is the expected gain from the possibility of reelection at
t+2and later due to election at t.T h eﬁrst term in (8) is the gain to the incumbent in periods t+1
and t +2of having policy reﬂect his preferred ideology rather than that of his opponent.
The second term is the value to the incumbent of having his preferred ﬁscal policy in period t+1
rather than that of his opponent. The assumption that ωh
L has a two-period life implies that as of
t the incumbent faces an expected diﬀerence with respect to the challenger’s preferences over voters
only at t +1(where the diﬀerence is uncertain since L does not know his opponent’s ωh
R, and hence
does not know what gR
t+1 will be if R is elected). As of t the incumbent’s expected preferences for
dates t +2and later are identical to those of a representative candidate. The assumption that the
government’s budget is balanced each period further implies that actions at t +1have no eﬀect on
the incumbent’s expected utility at t +2and later.
T h el a s tt e r mr e ﬂects the eﬀect of reelection at t on the probability of reelection at the end of
t +2and later. For example, if the probability of reelection at t +2is independent of the election
outcome at t,t h e nEtΠt+3 =0 . Conversely, if a party’s reelection at t increases the probability of its
reelection at t+2and later, then EtΠt+3 > 0, where the value of the higher probability of reelection
11at t+2and later stems (in the absence of “oﬃce rents”) solely from the ability to enact one’s preferred
ideological policies.13 The larger the positive eﬀect of electoral victory at t on the probability of later
election (where this eﬀect could be negative), the larger is EtΠt+3. Rents would add an important
component to the value of reelection at t and all future dates, as in section 5 below.
To summarize, the value of reelection depends on the implied possibility of reelection further into
the future, the value of policy reﬂecting one’s own rather than the opponent’s preferences, and the
value of rents. In all relevant cases, however, the expected value EL
t
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
will be strictly
positive.14
3.1.3 The election year
The incumbent’s objective ΩELE
t in the previous election year t can be written
ΩELE
t
¡
gL
t ,L
¢
= ZL
t
¡
gL
t
¢
+ β
¡
ρ
¡
NL¢
EL
t ΩIN
t+1
¡
gL
t+1,L
¢
+
¡
1 − ρ
¡
NL¢¢
EL
t ΩOUT
t+1
¢
(9)
where ρ, the incumbent’s perceived probability of reelection, is a function of the fraction of votes NL
t
the left-wing incumbent receives, and where ΩIN
t+1 and ΩOUT
t+1 are as deﬁned above.
Equation (9) may be written
ΩELE
t
¡
gL
t ,L
¢
= ZL
t
¡
gL
t
¢
+ ρ
¡
NL¢
βEL
t
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
+ βEL
t ΩOUT
t+1 (10)
Since EL
t ΩOUT
t+1 , the expected utility if not reelected, is independent of any choices the incumbent
makes, (10) makes clear that the choice of policy in an election year depends on the eﬀect of a choice
of gL
t on the politician’s current utility (as it would in an oﬀ-election year) versus the eﬀect on the
probability of reelection ρ
¡
NL¢
multiplied by the discounted value of reelection βEL
t
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
,
as discussed above.
For tractability, we assume that the probability ρ(NL) that the incumbent assigns to winning is a
continuous increasing function in NL (justiﬁed, for example, by assuming that the incumbent doesn’t
know how many votes he needs to win, or how many potential voters will show up to vote). The
13To take a simple example, if L’s re-election at t increases its expected probability of re-election at t+2(and hence
its probability of being in oﬃce at t +3and t +4 )f r o mρL to ˆ ρL >ρ L,b u th a sn oe ﬀect on later proababilities, we
would have
E
L
t Πt+3 =( 1+β)(ˆ ρL − ρL)

π
L − π
R

14Under some circumstances (for instance, if being elected today reduces the probability of future re-election), this
expected value may be negative. In those cases, the incumbent would simply not run for re-election. We only model a
situation where the incumbent has already decided to run.
12key point is that the incumbent maximizes this probability by maximizing the number of votes he
receives. Assuming that ρ0 is nonzero only for some ranges of NL would complicate the mathematics
without changing the basic qualitative results.15
The fraction of votes NL received by the incumbent is given by (where we have assumed both
regions have a unit mass of voters):
NL = φ1(g1
t)+φ2(g2
t)
where φh(gh
t ) is the fraction of region h’s votes that goes to the incumbent, and where the voter’s
inference problem yields the dependence of vote shares on current expenditure policy gh
t .W ed e r i v e
φh(gh
t ) in section 3.2 below.
The expected value of reelection to the L incumbent, EL
t
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
, is independent of the
choice of gh
t , so that the incumbent treats it as given in his period t choice of ﬁscal policy. For
the election year, the incumbent’s optimal choice is given by maximizing (10) subject to the budget
constraint (5), given the t +1decision (7). The ﬁrst-order condition at t (remember φh(gh
t ) is the
share of region h’s votes that goes to the incumbent) is:
ω1
L
g1
t
+ βρ0 (·)φ0
1
¡
g1
t
¢
EL
t
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
=
ω2
L
g2
t
+ βρ0 (·)φ0
2
¡
g2
t
¢
EL
t
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
(11)
The left-hand side of (11) represents the beneﬁt from a marginal increase in g1
t.A si nt h ep o s t -
election year, this beneﬁt includes the utility gain this change induces for voters in region 1,t h e
ﬁrst term on the left-hand side. However, prior to an election the politician potentially derives an
additional beneﬁt from targeting region 1 voters, namely obtaining more votes from them. The
right-hand side represents the same beneﬁt from a marginal increase in g2
t.
We may express the relation between gh
t and ωh
L more compactly as follows. Use 1 − ω1
L = ω2
L to
write (11) for choice of g1
t as
g1
t = ω1
t + βρ0 (·)EL
t
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
g1
tg2
t
¡
φ0
1
¡
g1
t
¢
− φ0
2
¡
g2
t
¢¢
. (12)
15A related analysis with discrete ρ(N
L) can be found in Drazen and Eslava (2005). An alternative in a multi-region
model are “winner-take-all” electoral rules, similar to Strömberg (2005), in which the candidate with a majority of
the votes wins the region, and the candidate with the majority of regions wins the election. ρ(·) w o u l dt h e nb et h e
probability of winning a majority of regions as a function of the vector of public goods spending targeted to each region.
13or
g1
t = ω1
L + A
¡
g1
t,g2
t
¢£
φ0
1
¡
g1
t
¢
− φ0
2
¡
g2
t
¢¤
(13a)
g2
t = ω2
L + A
¡
g1
t,g2
t
¢£
φ0
2
¡
g2
t
¢
− φ0
1
¡
g1
t
¢¤
(13b)
for goods g1
t and g2
t,w h e r eA
¡
g1
t,g2
t
¢
≡ βρ0 (·)EL
t
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
g1
tg2
t and where φ0
1
¡
g1
t
¢
− φ0
2
¡
g2
t
¢
is the vote gain to the incumbent from transferring a dollar of public goods expenditure from region
2 to region 1.( U s i n g g1
t + g2
t =1 , this could be expressed as a function solely of one of the gh
t .)
This vote gain from a change in expenditure composition is known to the incumbent politician, but
needn’t be known to the voters.
Since the only diﬀerence between an election year and a non-election year is the election itself,
a political budget cycle appears if gh
t 6= gh
t+1. The result in (13) thus implies that there will be a
political budget cycle as long as φ0
2
¡
g2
t
¢
6= φ0
1
¡
g1
t
¢
. We now turn to the inference and voting problem
of voters to ﬁnd out when is this the case.
3.2 Voter Decisions Based on Fiscal Policy
An individual’s only choice variable is how to vote in an election year. Consider a representative
election year t, where the voter’s choice depends on his expectation of utility in years t+1and later.
Our assumption that ωh
P,s has a two-period life starting in the election year means that in an
election year voters need look forward only one period. The voter may then consider each election
cycle independently. Consider the election cycle t and t +1 . A forward-looking voter j in region h
prefers the incumbent L over the challenger R if
Et
h
lngh
t+1 (L) | gh
t
i
− (πj − πL)2 >E t lngh
t+1 (R) − (πj − πR)2 (14)
Note that, given (5), observing the gt the other region receives provides no additional information on
ωh
L. (Since we are concentrating on a single election cycle, for simplicity of exposition, we drop the
time-subscript on the ωh
P,t
³
= ωh
P,t+1
´
). Condition (14) determines the relation between pre-electoral
ﬁscal policy gh
t and the incumbent’s vote share (and hence reelection probability).
T h ek e yi s s u ef o rv o t e ri n f e r e n c ei st h ei n f o r m a t i o np r o v i d e db ye l e c t i o n - y e a rﬁscal policy about
post-electoral utility. When voters know value of ωh
L ex ante, targeted expenditure cannot aﬀect
voting patterns. When voters do not have this information, the extent of their knowledge about the
distribution of ωh
L will determine the extent to which the incumbent is able to aﬀect the share of
14votes he receives in equilibrium. In addition, the incumbent has the incentive to target more “swing”
regions (more precisely, regions with high values of φ0
h (·) evaluated at gh
t+1, as discussed in section
4.1 below). Voters are aware of this incentive. Hence, targeting will be less eﬀective in attracting
votes (in the sense that voters from a smaller range of ideological positions in region h end up voting
for the incumbent) if voters know their region is highly likely to be electorally targeted. In short,
politicians may have more information than voters about the electoral importance of diﬀerent regions
(and of course about their own preferences), and the extent of the information asymmetry aﬀects the
ability of the incumbent to obtain political beneﬁts from targeted expenditures.
We consider three cases: full information; asymmetric information with a fully revealing ﬁscal
policy; asymmetric information where gh
t doesn’t reveal the politician’s preferences over regions.
3.2.1 Full information
When ωh
L (and ωh
R) is known, then E[lngh
t+1 (L)]−Et lngh
t+1 (R) depends only on the known ωh
P and
is independent of gh
t . Logarithmic utility implies gh
t+1 (L)=ωh
L, so that a voter who knows the ωh
P is
indiﬀerent between two candidates if his preferred ideological position is
˜ πh
FI
³
ωh
L
´
=
πL + πR
2
+
lnωh
L − lnωh
R
2(πR − πL)
(15)
Any voter j in region h with πj > ˜ πh
FI will vote for the challenger, and any voter with πj < ˜ πh
FI
will vote for the incumbent. Note that in this case ˜ πh
FI is independent of ﬁscal policy, so that voting
decisions cannot be aﬀected by pre-election ﬁscal policy. There will thus be no targeting of voters
through ﬁscal policy.
3.2.2 Asymmetric Information
When ωh
L is not known, voters must use gh
t (L) to obtain information on ωh
L. Using (14), where
(unlike the previous case) the expectation Et
£
lngh
t+1 (L)
¤
depends on gh
t , the ideological position of
the indiﬀerent voter, e πh, becomes
e πh(gh
t )=
πL + πR
2
+
Et
£
lngh
t+1 (L) | gh
t
¤
− μ
2(πR − πL)
(16)
where μ ≡ Et lngh
t+1 (R), the expected utility under the challenger. (Since the challenger has no way
to signal, μ simply depends on the prior). Within region h, all individuals with πj < e πh(gh
t ) vote
for the incumbent L party, while those with πj > e πh(gh
t ) vote for the R party. The dependence of
15the position of the indiﬀerent voter on gh
t follows from the eﬀect of observing gh
t on the utility voters
expect to receive if the incumbent is reelected.
W ec a nt h e ne x p r e s st h ef r a c t i o no fr e g i o nh voters who vote for the incumbent as a function of
the pre-election expenditure observed by voters. Denoting this fraction as φh(gh
t ) and denoting the
lower bound of πj by π, we obtain:
φh(gh
t )=
Z h πh(gh
t )
π
fh(π)dπ = Fh
³
e πh(gh
t )
´
(17)
where Fh (·) is the cumulative distribution associated with the density fh (·).V o t es h a r e sφh(·) depend
on gh
t because the indiﬀerent voter’s expectation of post-electoral utility is conditional on observed
gh
t . That is, since the politician’s choice of gh
t is used to form expectations of ωh and lngh
t+1 from
(13), the equilibrium expectation of period t +1utility will depend on the politician’s choice of gh
t .
Diﬀerentiating (17) with respect to gh
t ,o n eo b t a i n s
∂φh(gh
t )
∂gh
t
= fh
³
e πh(gh
t )
´ ∂e πh(gh
t )
∂gh
t
(18a)
= fh
³
e πh(gh
t )
´
·
"
∂Et
¡
lngh
t+1 (L) | gh
t
¢
∂gh
t
1
2(πR − πL)
#
(18b)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e de q u a t i o n s( 1 6 )a n d( 1 7 ) . N o t et h a tr e g i o n sd i ﬀer in the level of public goods
that they receive, and, partly as a result of this, in the ideological position of the indiﬀerent voter
in region h, e πh(gh
t ).W ea s s u m et h a tt h efh (·) have no mass points, so that a marginal increase in
e πh(gh
t ) cannot induce a discontinuous jump in the number of voters supporting the incumbent.
3.2.3 Revealing versus non-revealing ﬁscal policy under asymmetric information
There are two asymmetric information cases to consider — one where voters can perfectly infer ωL from
the gh
t (L), the other where they cannot. The ﬁrst case corresponds to voters knowing the densities
fh(π), with the only asymmetric information being about ω. In this case, the relation between gh
t
and ωh
L given in (13) allows voters to infer ωh
L from gh
t since fh(π) is known.16 That is, knowing the
region’s ideological distribution and having observed the incumbent’s spending choices, voters can
calculate ω1
L from (13a). The second case corresponds to voters not knowing the densities fh(π).
If voters can fully infer the value of the ωh
L from gh
t (L), then the ideological position of the
16The invertibility of the relationship between g
h
t and ω
h
t in equation 13, when fh is known, will become clear later.
We show below that
∂φh(gh
t )
∂gh
t
> 0,i m p l y i n gt h a tv o t e r sk n o wg
h
t is a monotonically increasing, and thus invertible,
function of ω
h
t .
16indiﬀerent voter is identical to the full information case, that is, e πh(gh
t )=e πh
FI for the same ωh
L (that
is, for the gh
t corresponding to that ωh
L from (13)). Hence, the incumbent gets the same number of
votes from each region as in the full information case. However, vote shares do respond to gh
t since a
change in gh
t reveals a change in ωh
L (whereas under full information the same change in ωh
L is known
directly) and hence induces a change in e πh. In the fully revealing case we thus get a separating
equilibrium with political manipulation analogous to that in Rogoﬀ (1990), where it is election year
changes in ﬁscal policy that allow separation. Hence, as we show in section 4.1, even if the ωL can
be perfectly inferred, a political cycle may still exist.
Alternatively (and more realistically), voters may have less information than do politicians about
how eﬀective spending targeted to a region is in terms of gaining votes. We incorporate this possibility
by assuming that voters are uncertain about the exact distribution of ideological positions in each
region (that is, the fh(π)). In this asymmetric information equilibrium, voters cannot fully infer
ωh
L from gh
t , which implies that e πh(gh
t ) 6= e πh
FI. There is then an “extra” mechanism for electoral
manipulation, since voters cannot infer to what extent they are targeted for electoral purposes, or
because the incumbent has a genuine preference for their region even in the absence of elections.
That is, voters in the two regions who receive the same level of public goods will be unable to infer
with certainty that this is not a reﬂection that they are equally liked.
In both cases φ0
h(gh
t ) measures the electoral beneﬁt to the politician from targeting an additional
dollar of public goods to voters in region. As can be seen from (18b), the size of this beneﬁt depends
ﬁrst on how much that additional dollar expands the range of ideological positions for which voters
prefer the incumbent, characterized by the position of the indiﬀerent voter e πh(gh
t ). If the utility that
voters expect under the incumbent in t +1increases, e πh(gh
t ) increases (that is, moves to the right)
and the range of supporters for the incumbent expands. For a given change in expected utility, the
increase of e πh(gh
t ) is smaller the farther apart πR and πL are, as the cost to voters from having their
least preferred ideological position in power becomes larger. Second, φ0
h(gh
t ) depends on the mass
of h voters at point e πh(gh
t ),n a m e l yfh
³
e πh(gh
t )
´
,which determines how many additional votes the
incumbent obtains from increasing e πh(gh
t ).17
17If voters in each region had preferences over both goods, then election-year targeting would be over goods rather
than regions, with the good that brings in more voters being the one that would increase in an electoral period relative
to a non-electoral period. There will still be a correspondence between targeting regions and targeting goods in that if
t h er e g i o nt h a ti sm o s tr e s p o n s i v et oﬁscal policy has a marked preference for, say, good 1, this is the good that will be
targeted.
174 Political-Economic Equilibrium
To close the model and derive the political-economic equilibrium under rational expectations,
we now relate incumbent’s optimal behavior in choosing gh
t as a function of φ0
h
¡
gh
t
¢
as summarized in
(13) with optimal voter behavior yielding the φ0
h
¡
gh
t
¢
for the gh
t received as summarized in (18b). (As
shown above, under full information, e πh and therefore φh are independent of gh
t ,s ot h a tφ0
h
¡
gh
t
¢
=0 .
Equations (6) and (13) therefore imply there is no political cycle in this case.)
The ﬁrst important result is that if vote shares can be aﬀected by targeted spending on public
goods (that is, in the asymmetric information case), such spending increases the share of votes that
goes to the incumbent, despite the fact that voters recognize the electoral incentives faced by the
incumbent.
Proposition 1 In a political equilibrium under asymmetric information, φ0
h
¡
gh
t
¢
> 0 for each h.
Proof: See Appendix
Under asymmetric information there are two cases to consider: the ﬁrst where ﬁscal policy fully
reveals the politicians preferences, the second where it does not. We consider them in turn.
4.1 Political Cycles in a Fully Revealing Equilibrium
Even if voters know the densities fh(π) for all regions and can therefore perfectly infer the
incumbent’s ωh
L, there is a political cycle:
Proposition 2 In a fully revealing political equilibrium, there is a political cycle in that gh
t 6= gh
t+1
for each h.
Proof: See Appendix
We will characterize which region gets targeted (that is, who receives more spending than in
the oﬀ-election year) in terms of which region is more swing than the other. It is important to
emphasize that we deﬁne being “swing” in a very precise sense: region 1 is considered the “swing”
one if φ0
1
¡
g1
t+1
¢
>φ 0
2
¡
g2
t+1
¢
. That is, a region is more swing than the other if, at the point where
both regions receive their oﬀ-election expenditure allocations, spending an extra dollar in region 1
earns the incumbent more votes than spending it in region 2. This deﬁnition captures the notion
that a swing group is one where votes are especially responsive to targeting.
If φ0
1
¡
g1
t+1
¢
>φ 0
2
¡
g2
t+1
¢
, then (13) together with decreasing marginal utility of gh
t (and the lack
of mass points in the fh distributions) imply that g1
t >g 1
t+1 and g2
t <g 2
t+1.T h em o r es w i n gr e g i o n
18will thus receive gh
t >g h
t+1, while the other region receives gh
t <g h
t+1. In other words, even though
voters can identify which is the region with a higher concentration of “swing voters” (higher φ0
h (·)
evaluated at gh
t+1) , that region will still be targeted. Florida will be targeted even if they know they
are “Florida”.
Though it may seem surprising that voters in the more swing region will respond to pre-electoral
targeting even when they know they are targeted for electoral purposes, it is not hard to see why
this must be true. Suppose, for example, that φ0
1
¡
g1
t+1
¢
>φ 0
2
¡
g2
t+1
¢
, and that this is known to voters
because they know the fh (π(·)) distribution for each group. Recognizing the incentives faced by the
incumbent, if voters in region 1 observed g1
t = g2
t, they would infer that the incumbent puts a lower
weight on their utility than on voters in region 2 because, despite being more attractive electorally,
they receive the same spending. If Floridians knew they were swing and nonetheless were not targeted
by the incumbent, they could only conclude that he places a low value on their utility (lower than
he actually does) and would thus vote against him. Conversely, in order to believe that both regions
are equally liked, voters would need to see more spending in group 1. Swing voters are thus indeed
responsive to ﬁscal targeting, despite recognizing the incumbent’s electoral incentives and knowing
they are an attractive electoral front.
Characterizing who gets targeted under asymmetric information in terms of the voter densities
fh(˜ πh ¡
gh
t
¢
), rather than in terms of φ0
h
¡
gh
t+1
¢
as we did above, is much harder. To see why, note
that two factors determine a region’s electoral value as captured by φ0
h in (18a): the density fh (·) of
voters along the ideological space and, given fh (·),t h ee ﬀect of gh
t on expected utility in t +1 .A
region can be more electorally valuable (that is, more “swing” as deﬁn e da b o v e )e v e ni fi th a sl o w e r
fh(˜ πh ¡
gh
t+1
¢
if gh
t is particularly eﬀective in raising voters’s expected utility. That is, if one considers
the density of voters at the non-electorally-motivated (that is, t +1) level of expenditures, it is clear
from (18a) that f1(˜ π1 ¡
g1
t+1
¢
) >f 2(˜ π2 ¡
g2
t+1
¢
) does not necessarily imply φ0
1
¡
g1
t+1
¢
>φ 0
2
¡
g2
t+1
¢
since
∂Et(lngh
t+1(L)|gh
t )
∂gh
t
will in general vary with gh
t . In particular, one could have that φ0
1
¡
g1
t+1
¢
is less than
φ0
2
¡
g2
t+1
¢
even though f1(˜ π1 ¡
g1
t+1
¢
) >f 2(˜ π2 ¡
g2
t+1
¢
) in cases where g2
t+1 were suﬃciently less than
g1
t+1. For instance, a region that in a non-election period receives a particularly low level of public
goods is attractive for electoral targeting since, given concavity of utility function, the impact on its
expected utility from a small increase in perceived ω is very high. It is also the case that the function
Et
¡
lngh
t+1 (L) | gh
t
¢
itself may vary across regions, as it depends on the information voters have about
fh(πh)).T h i sd i ﬃculty for characterizing how swing a region is in terms of its fh(πh)) distribution
also holds in the non-fully revealing case, to which now we move.
194.2 Non-Fully Revealing Political Equilibrium
Alternatively, voters in group h are unable to infer the ωh from the gh
t because they lack infor-
mation about the fh(π), implying that they cannot perfectly infer how many votes the incumbent
gets for targeting their group, φ0
h
¡
gh
t
¢
.T od e ﬁne an equilibrium, let us deﬁne
Ψ
³
gh
t
´
≡ Et
h
lngh
t+1 (L) | gh
t
i
(19)
which is a voter’s expected period t+1utility from g as a function of observed gh
t under asymmetric
information if incumbent L is reelected, given his information about fh(π) and ω. Using (13a) and
(13b), in equilibrium Ψ
¡
gh
t
¢
must satisfy
Ψ
¡
g1
t
¢
= Et ln
¡
g1
t − A
¡
g1
t,1 − g1
t
¢£
φ0
1
¡
g1
t
¢
− φ0
2
¡
1 − g1
t
¢¤¢
(20)
and a similar equation for region 2. Note that (18b) implies
φ0
h(gh
t )=
fh
¡
e π(gh
t )
¢
2(πR − πL)
Ψ0
³
gh
t
´
(21)
In this case we have dropped the superscript h from e πh(gh
t ) b e c a u s ev o t e r si ne a c hr e g i o nd on o t
know ex-ante how they diﬀer from those of the other region. As a result, the functions e π(gh
t ) and
Ψ
¡
gh
t
¢
are identical for both groups (though the levels gh
t at which they are evaluated will in general
diﬀer across regions). By substituting φ0
h(gh
t ) into equation (20) and using the deﬁnition of Ψ
¡
gh
t
¢
,
we can then write (20) as a ﬁrst order, non-linear, diﬀerential equation in the function Ψ(·),n a m e l y
Ψ
¡
g1
t
¢
= Et ln
"
g1
t −
A
¡
g1
t,1 − g1
t
¢
2(πR − πL)
µ
f1
¡
e π(g1
t)
¢
Ψ0 ¡
g1
t
¢
− f2
¡
e π(1 − g1
t)
¢
Ψ0 ¡
1 − g1
t
¢¶#
(22)
A function Ψ(·) that solves this equation would characterize a rational political equilibrium in
which voters are maximizing their expected utility, incorporating optimal government behavior in
response to voter behavior based on correct expectations. This equation captures voters’s beliefs
aﬀecting electoral outcomes, and therefore the choice of policy, and policy in turn aﬀecting their
beliefs. That is,
DEFINITION: A rational political equilibrium under asymmetric information is a combination
of gh
t and Ψ
¡
gh
t
¢
(for h =1 ,2) such that: 1) voters are choosing how to vote optimally according
to (14) given their beliefs; 2) the incumbent chooses g1
t and g2
t optimally according to (13) given
20voters’s beliefs; and 3) voters’s beliefs are rational and based on the politician’s behavior and the
known distributions of π and ω (so that the incumbent’s policy choice of gh
t ratiﬁes voters’s beliefs,
that is, Ψ
¡
gh
t
¢
).
4.3 Characteristics of A Non-Revealing Political Equilibrium
Because (22) is a nonlinear diﬀerential equation in the function Ψ(·), we cannot solve it analyt-
ically. (We provide a numerical solution in section 6 below for the case including rents to holding
oﬃce). We can however derive some characteristics of equilibrium.
As shown in Proposition 1, under asymmetric information φ0
h
¡
gh
t
¢
is strictly positive. It follows
from (11) that the more electorally valuable region will be targeted in the election year in the general
asymmetric information case, as was the case in a fully revealing equilibrium. That is,
Proposition 3 The region with the higher value of φ0
h (·) evaluated at the post-electoral gh
t+1 receives
higher targeted expenditures in an election period t relative to the subsequent non-election period t+1,
while the other region receives lower targeted expenditures in t relative to t +1 .
Proof: See Appendix
Intuitively, if one region is more electorally valuable when its voting behavior is evaluated at the
non-electorally motivated level of public goods provided, then in an election period ﬁscal policy will
be targeted to get its votes.
Note that an important diﬀerence between this scenario and the fully revealing case is that here
the shares of votes received by each candidate may diﬀer from what results under full information.
The reason is that voters cannot perfectly infer the ωh
t from observed spending and, as a result, the
ideological position of the indiﬀerent voter will in general diﬀer from that in the full information
case. Moreover, this limited inference ability of voters gives the incumbent extra “space” for political
manipulation in the following precise sense: a smaller fraction of the ideological spectrum of a swing
region will be captured by the incumbent in the fully-revealing equilibrium than in the non-revealing
case. In other words, if swing voters knew they were swing, they would be able to correctly interpret
high pre-election spending on them as partly reﬂecting their electoral attractive rather then them
being genuinely liked by the incumbent. Conversely, in the less important non-swing region the
incumbent will convince more ideological positions to vote for him in the fully-revealing case than
under asymmetric information about the fh.18
18To see that this is the case with a simple example, suppose that in the non-revealing case voters assign a probability
21In order to highlight the eﬀect of targeted expenditures on voting, it was assumed in the model
that there is no competition over ideology in an election. However, ideology aﬀects the size of targeted
expenditure in an election period. Greater ideological diﬀerences between the two candidates have
an u m b e ro fe ﬀects on the use of targeted expenditure policy, which may be summarized by (21),
reproduced here:
φ0
h(gh
t )=
fh
³
e πh(gh
t )
´
2(πR − πL)
Ψ0
³
gh
t
´
Consider a mean-preserving increase in the diﬀerence between πR and πL. Given the voter density
fh (·) and expectation function Ψ
¡
gh
t
¢
, the larger is the ideological spread between the two parties,
that is, the greater is πR − πL, the smaller will be the eﬀect of targeted expenditures on votes. The
reason is that the greater is πR−πL, the smaller is the eﬀect of targeted expenditure on e πh(gh
t ),s i n c e
the larger is the cost of voters of not having actual policy be their preferred option between πR and
πL. Put another way, the greater is the diﬀerence between the two parties’ ideological positions, the
more voting is inﬂuenced by ideology and the less by targeted expenditure. This “ﬁrst-order” eﬀect
is as one would expect intuitively. Conversely, in close ideological elections, targeted expenditures
would play a large role.
However, since a change in πR − πL aﬀects the position of the indiﬀerent voter e πh(gh
t ) in (16),
there will in general be eﬀects on φ0
h(gh
t ) via fh (·) and Ψ
¡
gh
t
¢
. As above, the net eﬀect will depend
on the distribution of ideology.
5 Rents to Holding Oﬃce
We now add a value of holding oﬃce (over and above the value to the politician of enacting his
own preferred ideology), which we call “rents” . Speciﬁcally, a part of government expenditure may
be spent on a good K that is valued only by the politician (“desks”). The key eﬀect of this change is
the possibility that targeted public goods expenditures to all regions rise in an election year, at the
p that φ
0
1

g
1
t

− φ
0
2

g
2
t

takes a given high value H, and a probability (1 − p) that it takes a low value L (H>L ).
Suppose also that φ
0
1

g
1
t

− φ
0
2

g
2
t

is actually high (note that here we are evaluating φ
0
h (·) at the current spending
level). Denote as E
FR
lng
1
t+1|g
1
t

and E
NFR
lng
1
t+1|g
1
t

the expected value assigned by voters to their post-electoral
utility under the incumbent in, respectively, the Fully Revealing equilibrium and the Non-Fully Revealing equilibrium.
Equation (13a) implies that E
FR
lng
1
t+1|g
1
t

and E
NFR
lng
1
t+1|g
1
t

in the asymmetric case relate to one another
according to
E
FR
lng
1
t+1|g
1
t

= E
NFR
lng
1
t+1|g
1
t

+( 1− p)ln
1 − Λg
2
tH
1 − Λg2
tL
<E
NFR
lng
1
t+1

where Λ = βρ
0 (·)E
L
t

Ω
IN
t+1 − Ω
OUT
t+1

22expense of K. This result does not depend on voters assigning no value to K, only that there are
some types of expenditure that voters as a whole value less than others, and these may be cut in an
election year. The characterization of K as total waste in the eyes of voters is simply an extreme way
to capture those diﬀerences in the value assigned by voters to diﬀerent goods and services provided
by the government.
The government’s budget constraint now becomes
T = g1
s + g2
s + Ks s = t,t +1 ,... (24)
The voter’s problem is as described in section 3.2, except that here we assume, for simplicity, that
voters in each region observe only their own gh
t , but not that of the other region. The politician’s
objective function is obviously diﬀerent than in section 3.1. The incumbent L’s objective in a non-
election year t +1parallels (4) but with the addition of rents:
ΩIN
t+1(gL
t+1,L)=ZL
t+1
¡
gL
t+1
¢
+ χ(Kt+1)+βEL
t+1
¡
ΩELE
t+2 (·,L)
¢
(25)
where rents χ are an increasing, weakly concave function of K.19 The incumbent’s objective in the
election year t can then be written
ΩELE
t
¡
gL
t ,L
¢
= ZL
t
¡
gL
t
¢
+ χ(Kt)+β
¡
ρ
¡
NL¢
EL
t ΩIN
t+1
¡
gL
t+1,L
¢
+
¡
1 − ρ
¡
NL¢¢
EL
t ΩOUT
t+1
¢
(26)
The diﬀerence Et
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
is
(1 + β)
¡
πL − πR¢2
+ EL
t
¡
ZL
t+1
¡
gL
t+1
¢
− ZL
t+1
¡
gR
t+1
¢¢
+( 1+β)EL
t χ(Kt+1)+β2EL
t Πt+3 (27)
but where the value in EtΠt+3 to being in oﬃce after t +2includes the expected present discounted
value of future oﬃce rents in addition to ideology. Equation (27) represents four components in this
model which make reelection valuable, three of which were present in (8): the ability to implement
one’s preferred ideology; the ability to target expenditures to preferred regions; the rents from oﬃce;
and the possibility that reelection at t gives to win future reelection and hence gain future advantage
of being in oﬃce.
With rents from holding oﬃce, the ﬁrst-order condition in a non-election year for each region h
19Although politicians could diﬀer in the value they place on rents relative to voters, we assume that all politicians
assign the same value to such expenditures. Drazen and Eslava (2005) consider politicians who diﬀer in the weight they
put on voters relative to “rents”, where this weight is unobserved and all voters are homogeneous.
23(found by maximizing (25) subject to (24)) equates the marginal value of targeted expenditures to
the marginal value of rents (where once again we consider gh
t and Kt over a single election cycle, so
we suppress the time subscripts on ωh
L,t):
ωh
L
gh
t+1
= χ0(Kt+1) h =1 ,2 (28)
These ﬁrst-order conditions for the two regions yield (6). Similarly, for an election year, one derives
a ﬁrst-order condition equating the value of targeted expenditures to the value of oﬃce rents:
ωh
L
gh
t
+ βρ0 (·)φ0
h
³
gh
t
´
Et
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
= χ0(Kt) (29)
for h =1 ,2.
The left hand side of (29) represents the beneﬁt from a marginal increase in gh
t .A s i n t h e
post-election period, this beneﬁt includes the utility gain this change induces for region h’s voters.
However, prior to an election the politician potentially derives an additional beneﬁt from targeting
region h, namely obtaining more votes from this region’s voters.
Since (29) holds for both regions, optimal choices of g
1
tand g
2
t therefore also satisfy:
ω1
L
g1
t
−
ω2
L
g2
t
= βρ0 (·)Et
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
·
£
φ0
2
¡
g2
t
¢
− φ0
1
¡
g1
t
¢¤
(30)
With respect to the post-electoral allocation of expenditures there is a pre-electoral shift of gov-
ernment resources away from “desks” and into targeted spending. In other words, Kt <K t+1.T o
see that this is the case, combine φ0
h
¡
gh
t
¢
> 0 with the fact that Kt+1 satisﬁes the post-election
ﬁrst-order condition (28). Given these two elements, if the incumbent were to choose Kt = Kt+1,t h e
pre-election marginal beneﬁt of targeted public goods spending would exceed that of desks.S i n c e
χ(K) is (weakly) concave, satisfying the pre-election ﬁrst-order condition (29) requires lower non-
targeted expenditure before the election. The pre-electoral shift of resources toward targeted spending
holds for any realization of ω1
L and ω2
L, so that all types of politicians have incentives to change the
composition of expenditures prior to an election.
How do electoral motives change the allocation of resources across regions in the pre-election
period, compared to non-election periods? That is, how do g1
t and g2
t compare to g1
t+1 and g2
t+1?W e
provide here an intuitive discussion of how these resources are allocated.
In t +1there is no electoral motive for targeted public goods spending, so g1
t+1 and g2
t+1 serve
as the reference point in measuring electoral eﬀects. Without loss of generality, suppose that voters
24in region 1 are more electorally valuable, that is, φ0
1
¡
g1
t+1
¢
>φ 0
2
¡
g2
t+1
¢
.S i n c e Kt+1,g 1
t+1 and g2
t+1
satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition (28), and φ0
h (g) > 0, the following relations hold:
ωh
L
gh
t+1
+ βρ0 (·)φ0
h
³
gh
t+1
´
Et
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
>χ 0 (Kt+1) for h =1 ,2
and
ω1
L
g1
t+1
−
ω2
L
g2
t+1
>β ρ 0 (·)Et
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢£
φ0
2
¡
g2
t
¢
− φ0
1
¡
g1
t
¢¤
That is, if the t+1composition of spending was imposed in t, the marginal beneﬁt of expenditures
targeted to any region would exceed that of K,a n dt h eb e n e ﬁt of spending one more dollar on public
goods for region 1 exceeds that of spending it on region 2. Given the concavity of χ(K), the incumbent
then has the incentive to transfer resources from non-targeted expenditures K to g1,t h em o s tv a l u a b l e
form of targeted spending. What happens to g2
t and the ﬁnal eﬀect on Kt depend on the relative
distance between φ0
1
¡
g1
t+1
¢
and φ0
2
¡
g2
t+1
¢
.
There are two cases to consider. If φ0
1
¡
g1
t+1
¢
and φ0
2
¡
g2
t+1
¢
are similar in value, then both g1
t and
g2
t will be higher than the corresponding g1
t+1 and g2
t+1, since a small increase in g1
t will suﬃce to
make the marginal beneﬁt of transferring resources to region 2 equal to that of transferring resources
to region 1. The equilibrium composition of spending before the election would involve lower Kt and
higher targeted spending to both regions compared to the post-election period. Alternatively, if the
values of φ0
1
¡
g1
t+1
¢
and φ0
2
¡
g2
t+1
¢
are not close to one another, then it may be the case that while
g1
t >g 1
t+1 unambiguously, targeted spending on region 2 will fall, that is, g2
t <g 2
t+1.T h a ti s ,r a t h e r
than reducing desks to ﬁnance all electoral spending on region 1, the politician takes expenditures
away from region 2.
6A n E x a m p l e
Because of the involved nature of an analytical solution for Ψ
¡
gh
t
¢
, further characterizing equi-
librium outcomes in general is diﬃcult. We therefore present a speciﬁc illustrative example, which
may also help the reader’s intuition. .
6.1 Calculating an Equilibrium
We make the following speciﬁc assumption about functional forms. Let χ(K)=θK,w h e r eθ is a
constant. Let Et
¡
ΩIN
t+1 − ΩOUT
t+1
¢
= ¯ Ω, a constant since a politician’s expectation of his future utility
depends on his current choice of gh
t only through its eﬀect on election probabilities. For simplicity in
25this illustration, we assume that πR(= −πL)=0 .25. For tractability. let ρ(NL) be a linear function
of the form ¯ ρNL,s ot h a t¯ ρ is the marginal eﬀect of one more vote on the probability of winning. We
assume
fh (π)=αh exp(−|π|)
where αh = 1
2(1−exp(−
_
π
h))
. This distribution has the nice feature of being concentrated and symmetric
around zero (the midpoint between πI and πC), and will prove tractable. Here,
_
π
h and −
_
π
h are,
respectively, the upper and lower bound for π in region h.
We assume that both voters and incumbent know one of the two regions is characterized by
αh = α and the other by αh = α (equivalently,
_
π
h takes one value for one of the regions and another
for the other region). However, only politicians know which region has each value of α, while voters
simply assign some probability pα
h that region h is the one with α: Pr(αh = α)=pα
h.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions (28) and (29) the incumbent’s optimal choices for gh
t+1 and gh
t are
given by:
gh
t+1 =
ωh
L
θ
(31)
and
ωh
L
gh
t
+ Λφ0
h
³
gh
t
´
= θ (32)
where Λ = β¯ ρ¯ Ω is the value of one additional vote to the incumbent.
In order to ﬁnd a solution for φ0
h
¡
gh
t (L)
¢
consistent with voters forming expectations rationally,
we ﬁrst rewrite the incumbent’s ﬁrst-order condition (32) to note explicitly its dependence on indi-
viduals’s expectations. Using equation (18a) and our assumptions about fh,π L,a n dπR,n o t et h a t
φ0
h
¡
gh
t (L)
¢
can be written as:
φ0
h
³
gh
t (L)
´
= ah exp
h
−
¯ ¯
¯E
³
lnωh
L | gh
t (L)
´
− E
³
lnωh
R
´¯ ¯
¯
i ∂E
¡
lnωh
L | gh
t (L)
¢
∂gh
t
(33)
or, letting Y (gh
t ) ≡ exp
£
−
¯ ¯E
¡
lnωh
L | gh
t
¢
− E
¡
lnωh
R
¢¯ ¯¤
,
φ0
h
³
gh
t (L)
´
=
ahY 0(gh
t ) if E
¡
lnωh
L | gh
t
¢
≤ E
¡
lnωh
R
¢
−ahY 0(gh
t ) if E
¡
lnωh
L | gh
t
¢
>E
¡
lnωh
R
¢ (34)
Since Y (gh
t ) is the component of φ0
h
¡
gh
t
¢
aﬀected by voters’s expectations, our analysis of their beliefs
will focus on Y (gh
t ). Also, the incumbent and challenger are identical ex-ante,s oωh
R is characterized
by the same unconditional distribution that characterizes ωh
L. E
¡
lnωh
R
¢
is formed according to that
26unconditional distribution.
Voters infer the relationship between ωh
L and gh
t from the ﬁrst-order condition (32), and use it to
form expectations about the future. That relationship is given by
ωh
L =
gh
t
¡
θ − αhΛY 0(gh
t )
¢
if E
¡
lnωh
L | gh
t
¢
≤ E
¡
lnωh
R
¢
gh
t
¡
θ + αhΛY 0(gh
t )
¢
if E
¡
lnωh
L | gh
t
¢
>E
¡
lnωh
R
¢ (35)
It is clear from this expression that information about αh (the electoral attractiveness of a region)
inﬂuences how voters respond to pre-electoral manipulation. If ah were known to voters, they could
perfectly infer ωh
L from their observation of gh
t . This would correspond to what we call above a
“perfectly revealing equilibrium”.
Voters form E
¡
lnωh
L | gh
t
¢
by taking logs on both sides of (35), and using Pr(αh =¯ α)=p¯ α
h.
Writing these expectations in terms of Y (gh
t ), we obtain:
Y (gh
t )=
e−E(lnωh
R)gh
t θ
£
1 − αΛ
θ Y 0(gh
t )
¤pα
h £
1 − αΛ
θ Y 0(gh
t )
¤(1−pα
h)
if gh
t ≤ ¯ g
eE(lnωh
R)
³
gh
t θ
£
1+αΛ
θ Y 0(gh
t )
¤pα
h £
1+αΛ
θ Y 0(gh
t )
¤(1−pα
h)´−1
if gh
t > ¯ g
(36)
where ¯ g is such that E
¡
lnωh
L | gh
t
¢
≤ E
¡
lnωh
R
¢
if and only if gt ≤ ¯ g.20 This is the ﬁrst order
diﬀerential equation that characterizes rational voters’s beliefs. Note that expression (35) represents
the incumbent’s optimal choice of gh
t given voters’s expectations, while expression (36) represents
voters’s rational expectations, given the incumbent’s actions. Equilibrium outcomes are therefore
represented by a function Y (gh
t ) that solves expression (36), and the choice of gh
t that satisﬁes (35)
for that Y (gh
t ). We now proceed to the illustration of those outcomes.
6.2 Illustration
To illustrate the eﬀect of electoral cycles on ﬁscal choices, we obtain a function Y (gh
t ) that solves
the diﬀerential equation (36), and then ﬁnd the incumbent’s optimal choice of gh
t given ωL and that
function Y (gh
t ). For expenditure levels above ¯ g we use numerical methods to ﬁnd a solution to (36).
The procedure we use to solve (36) is further explained in the appendix.
Suppose that for both L and R, ωh follows a uniform distribution with values between ωl =0 .2
and ωu =0 .8. In terms of other parameters, the speciﬁc solution we depict is based on θ =1 .3,
20The fact that E

lnω
h
L | g
h
t

is increasing in g
h
t was proved for the general case in previous sections (it is implied
by φ
0
h(g
h
t )). This example is, in any case, self-contained: we can consider the positive slope of E

lnω
h
L | g
h
t

as a
conjecture, which will then prove consistent with the politicians’ choices.
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α1 =1 .93 (or ¯ π1 =0 .3), α2 =0 .79 (or ¯ π2 =1 ), Λ =0 .1,a n dp¯ πh=1 =0 .65.21
The solution to the problem can be summarized by φ0(gh
t ), and the resulting choice of gh
t (L) as
a function of ωh
L and αh. We depict them in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows φ0(gh
t ) for the two
regions, where we denote as “swing” the region with ¯ π1 =0 .3 (larger mass of voters concentrated
in the π =0neighborhood), and the other region as “non-swing”. Figure 2, meanwhile, depicts the
incumbent’s optimal choice of election-period public goods spending on each region, gh
t (ωh),g i v e n
the weight he puts on voters in that region. It also shows the level of spending a region h would
receive in the the post-election period, for each possible ωh (denoted gt+1 in the graph). Note from
equation (21) that in this case we are able to characterize the swing region in terms of the fh (π)
distributions. This is because of two reasons: 1) we compare the two regions as if they received the
same gh
t (for each possible gh
t level), and 2) we study the non-revealing case, so that the e πh(gh
t ) and
the Ψ0 ¡
gh
t
¢
functions are equal for both groups.
Examine ﬁrst Figure 1. For any possible level of gh
t , a marginal increase in spending leads to a
greater gain in votes if it is given to the region with more swing voters. Hence, the incumbent chooses
to target that region, as shown in Figure 2. However, both regions receive more spending than in
the post election period (since the marginal utility of rents is constant and lower than the marginal
utility of increasing spending on voters in either region before the election, relative to post-election
21The choice of Λ is consistent, for instance, with β =0 .95, ρ =1and ¯ Ω =0 .11. We solved the problem for diﬀerent
sets of parameters such as ρ, ¯ Ω,a n dt h eo t h e rp a r a m e t e r s ,a n dt h eb a s i ci n s i g h t sa r es i m i l a r .W eb r i e ﬂyd i s c u s sb e l o w
the implications of varying these parameters. The choice of p
¯ πh=1 =0 .65 must be interpreted as saying that we will
study the voting behavior of, and the expenditure received by, a given group h whose voters believe that the probability
that they are characterized by ¯ π
h =1is 0.65.
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Figure 2: Optimal choice of gh
t as a function of ωh (voters uncertain about ah)
levels).22
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We present a model of a political budget cycle in which politicians use public goods expendi-
tures targeted to more politically “useful” voters at the expense of other voters (or other categories of
expenditures). Hence, electoral manipulation is present, but does not show up in aggregate expendi-
tures or deﬁcits in the government budget, consistent with recent empirical ﬁndings about established
democracies. Election-year provision of pork-barrel spending “works” even though forward-looking
rational voters correctly solve the inference problem of trying to discern the motivation for election-
year spending under imperfect information. That is, election-year economics succeeds in gaining the
votes of rational voters, even though they know there is some probability that they are being targeted
solely to get their votes. Even in the extreme case where voters know just how “swing” they are, an
electoral cycle in pork barrel spending will in general be present.
22The extent to which pre- and post-electoral policy diﬀer (i.e. the size of the political budget cycle) obviously depends
on the speciﬁc parameters chosen. For instance, larger values of Λ imply a larger value of re-election, and therefore
lead the incumbent to chose larger g
h
t . Small values of θ imply that the post-election level of targeted expenditure is
already high (for any candidate) and, given decreasing marginal utility, reduce the potential diﬀerences between one
and another candidate in terms of provision of targeted goods. This reduces the incentives for electoral increases of
g
h
t . For large enough θ, one of the two groups receives less spending before than after the election. Larger ideological
gaps between the diﬀerent candidates reduce the importance voters give to ﬁscal policy in choosing the candidate, and
therefore reduce the incentives for electoral increases of g
h
t .D i ﬀerent choices of α
1 and α
2 will change the electoral
beneﬁt the incumbent can obtain from increasing g
h
t , as can be deduced from the ﬁgures above. The general patterns
of electoral changes for g
h
t , however, are quite robust to the parameters chosen.
29A key innovation of the paper is to introduce asymmetric information about a variable other
than competence in order to explain the why targeted spending is eﬀective in attracting rational
voters. The concern of voters about the preferences of the incumbent over diﬀerent voting groups,
rather than about his competence, is more than a semantic diﬀerence. In the competence approach,
it is crucial that voters cannot observe not only the characteristics of the incumbent but also some
component of the budget. In contrast, our approach implies that a political budget cycle may
emerge even if voters fully observe all of the incumbent’s ﬁscal policy choices. We therefore shift the
focus from unobservability of key components of ﬁscal policy (which would not seem to characterize
more developed democracies) to less than perfect observability of a politician’s underlying policy
preferences. As indicated, this shift in what characteristic of politician’s is unobserved has signiﬁcant
implications for the type of political ﬁscal cycle consistent with voter rationality.
Our focus on politicians favoring some groups over others is motivated by traditional election-year
economics, which gives a key role to special interests in electoral budget manipulation. Although the
idea of pork barrel politics is common in political economy, it has not been incorporated in intertem-
poral models of ﬁscal policymaking. That is, models in which politicians choose targeted expenditure
in order to gain political support generally assume that politicians can commit to whatever promises
they make. In an electoral context, this approach leaves unanswered a key question, namely, why
forward-looking voters who are targeted by a candidate before an election ﬁnd it rational to vote for
that candidate. Hence, the question of why pork barrel spending attracts voters requires a more fully
articulated model than is found in previous literature. We think this paper makes progress in that
direction.
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32APPENDICES
A Proofs of Propositions
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : Suppose φ0
h
¡
gh
t
¢
≤ 0. The incumbent would then get more votes by
reducing, or at least not increasing, targeted spending to group h. Larger gh
t in this case cannot be
driven by electoral motives, but by ωh
L being high. Increases in gh
t then lead voters in group h to
perceive higher ωh
L and thus to expect higher post-election utility. As a result, more group h voters
want to vote for the incumbent, that is, φ0
h
¡
gh
t
¢
> 0. This contradicts the initial assumption. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose voters can perfectly infer the ωh
L from gh
t ,t h a ti s ,t h ep o l i t i c i a n ’ s
decision rule gh
t (ωh
L) is invertible, to obtain the equilibrium relation ωh
L = e ω
¡
gh
t
¢
. This implies that
Et
£
lngh
t+1 (L) | gh
t
¤
=l n
£
e ω
¡
gh
t
¢¤
. Therefore, letting e πh
PR be the indiﬀerent voter’s position in this
perfectly revealing equilibrium, we obtain:
e πh
PR(gh
t )=
πL + πR
2
+
ln
£
e ω
¡
gh
t
¢¤
− μ
2(πR − πL)
From the deﬁnition of φh (·) in (17) and this e πh
PR(gh
t ), it follows that φh in this perfectly revealing
equilibrium depends on gh
t . Hence, from Proposition 1 we know φ0
h(gh
t ) > 0.M o r e o v e r ,
φ0
h(gh
t )=
fh(˜ πh
PR)
2(πR − πL) e ω
¡
gh
t
¢
∂e ω
¡
gh
t
¢
/∂gh
t
e ω
¡
gh
t
¢ (A1)
Since in general the density of voters is not the same across groups (that is, f1(˜ π1
PR) 6= f2(˜ π2
PR)),( A 1 )
implies that, in general, φ0
1
¡
g1
t+1
¢
6= φ0
2
¡
g2
t+1
¢
. In other words, the additional vote share obtainable
from the two groups is not equal in the case gh
t = gh
t+1 for h =1 ,2.T h e ngh
t = gh
t+1
¡
= ωh
L
¢
cannot
solve (13). ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Suppose, without loss of generality, φ0
1
¡
g1
t+1
¢
>φ 0
2
¡
g2
t+1
¢
.T h e ng1
t = g1
t+1 ¡
= ω1
L
¢
and g2
t = g2
t+1
¡
= ω2
L
¢
cannot solve (13). Proposition 1 and equations (13a) and (13b) then
imply that g1
t >g 1
t+1 and g2
t <g 1
t+1. ¤
B A solution to equation (36)
The gh
t ≤ ¯ g branch of equation (36) is solved by the following expression:
Y (gh
t )=e−E(lnωh
R)gh
t θc0 (A2)
where c0 is such that
c0 =( 1− αΛe−E(lnωh
R)c0)pα
(1 − αΛe−E(lnωh
R)c0)(1−pα) (A3)
We use expression (A2) and the deﬁnition of ¯ g given after (36) (which implies Y (¯ g)=1 )t oﬁnd:
¯ g =
eE(lnωh
R)
θc0
and choose the value of c0 that solves (A3) and ensures 0 ≤ ¯ g ≤ 1.
33For the gh
t ≥ ¯ g branch of equation (36) we ﬁnd a numerical solution based on a ﬁnite-diﬀerence
approximation to the equation. The speciﬁc solution we choose is the one that ensures Y (¯ g)=1and
Y
0
(¯ g)=−e−E(lnωh
R)θc0 (where, given (A2), the latter amounts to φ0(gh
t ) being smooth around ¯ g).
We ﬁrst denote Yi ≡ Y (gi) (where i indexes the grid of gh
t we use), and replace Y 0(gh
t ) with a ﬁnite
diﬀerence approximation to it, namely,
Yi+1−Yi
gh
i+1−gh
i+1
. Then, re-write this branch of equation (36) as
F(Y,Y 0,gh
t )=Y (gt)gh
t θ
∙
1+α
Λ
θ
Y 0(gh
t )
¸pα
h ∙
1+α
Λ
θ
Y 0(gh
t )
¸(1−pα
h)
− eE(lnωh
R) =0,
where Y 0 is as explained above. This can be seen as a system of N equations on Yi and Yi+1 for
N diﬀerent values of gt in the [¯ g,1] interval. Since we know the value of Y0 = Y (¯ g) and ¯ g,t h e
system only has N unknowns, and we can solve for them. The solution is found using a quasi-
Newton method of Broyden (see, for example, Boyce and DiPrima, 1997), where we use as initial
guess Y (gh
t )=( 0 .99,0.98,...,0). We also try two other alternatives methods to solve this branch of
equation (36) with similar results.23
23The ﬁrst alternative method uses a modiﬁed Runge-Kutta algorithm. This algorithm approximates a solution to
Y (g
h
t ) by iteratively generating values of this function and Y
0(g
h
t ) from initial values. In our case, the initial values are
Y (¯ g)=1and Y
0
(¯ g)=−e
−E(ln ωh
R)θc0. In each step of this iteration, the algorithm uses the value of Y
0
(g
h
t ) given by
the diﬀerential equation and the value of Y (g
h
t ) calculated in the previous step. Since our diﬀerential equation is not
linear in Y
0
(g
h
t ), we obtain this value of Y
0
(g
h
t ) using an algorithm of Broyden (for this and the Runge-Kutta algorithms
see, for instance, Boyce and DiPrima [1997]). Our second alternative method ﬁnds an analytic solution to a ﬁrst-order
Taylor approximation to the gt >
_
g branch of (36).
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